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Abstract 
Fake file systems are used in the field of cyber deception to bait intruders and fool forensic investigators. File 
system researchers also frequently generate their own synthetic document repositories, due to data privacy and 
copyright concerns associated with experimenting on real-world corpora. For both these fields, realism is 
critical. Unfortunately, after creating a set of files and folders, there are no current testing standards that can be 
applied to validate their authenticity, or conversely, reliably automate their detection. This paper reviews the 
previous 30 years of file system surveys on real world corpora, to identify a set of discrete measures for 
generating synthetic file systems. Statistical distributions, such as size, age and lifetime of files, common file 
types, compression and duplication ratios, directory distribution and depth (and its relationship with numbers of 
files and sub-directories) were identified and the respective merits discussed. Additionally, this paper highlights 
notable absences in these surveys, which could be beneficial, such as analysing, on mass, the text content 
distribution, file naming habits, and comparing file access times against traditional working hours.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the implementation of the Multics Operating System 40 years ago, most current operating system 
software provides a facility to organise programs and data files in hierarchical structures (Henderson, 2004). 
File systems can contain the base executable version of the operating system in additional to applications and 
configuration data (Kim and Spafford, 1994). Users can also employ file systems as a central repository of their 
collective knowledge, such as correspondence, study material, travel information, financial records and 
inventions (Salminen, et al., 1997). 
Fake file systems are a set of synthetic data files arranged in a manner to replicate real digital repositories. 
While artificially created file systems are used in cyber deception to lure unauthorised users or to sustain a 
falsehood, they also have other important benign applications, such as supporting research and development into 
replication and archiving. The key limitation in their application is an absence of common or agreed baseline 
metrics for building or evaluating these synthetic products. The consequence of this research gap is that fake file 
systems can be produced that either lack realism, contain uniquely identifiable characteristics that can be 
detected, or both. This paper presents the results of a literature review of the previous thirty years of published 
file system surveys. The aim of the research is to extract metrics and identify common themes to improve the 
realism and reduce detectability of synthetic file systems. These results are the first step in a multi-stage process. 
The next stage of the research is to test these common statistical distributions by building replica file systems.  
FILE ATTRIBUTES 
Most modern operating systems provide users with visibility of characteristics of accessible files, such as 
content, attributes and metadata (Carrier and Spafford, 2004). Characteristics such as file name, file size, 
location, and file type or file-extension assist users to identify specific documents and navigate the file system 
(Ritchie and Thompson, 1974). Time-based attributes can also be accessed by the user, such as: (1) atime - 
updated when the file is read; (2) mtime - updated when the file contents change (the default file time in most 
cases); and (3) ctime - updated when the file or certain file characteristics (owner, permissions) change (Daley 
and Neumann, 1965). The user and group identifier were also introduced in Unix (and later adopted by 
Microsoft's New Technology File System) providing information on who can read, write and execute the file 
(Buchholz and Spafford, 2004). The owner of the file can also modify the filename, which can provide clues to 
the purpose, version number and creation date (Anquetil and Lethbridge, 1997).   
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Additional information can also be obtained from documents with further analysis, such as inspecting the 
content of the file to classify the type and whether or not the file is encrypted or compressed (Erbacher and 
Mulholland, 2007; Li et al., 2005; McDaniel, M., & Heydari, 2003). Some file types also save additional 
metadata in the contents, such as the author's name, initials, organisation name, computer's name, document 
revisions and versions, template information and comments. Files can be differentiated through review of their 
content's entropy (Shannon, 2001), word and character count, strings, language and writing style analysis 
(Mosteller and Wallace, 1963; Somers and Tweedie, 2003; Abbasi and Chen, 2008) and cryptographic hash 
(Kim, 1994).   
Combinations of characteristics can be used to categorise and classify files (Goncalves and Jorge, 2003; Ellard, 
et al., 2003), and unexpected combinations can be used to differentiate the real from the fake (Rowe, 2005).  
FAKE FILE SYSTEMS 
Individual fake files have been referred to as honeytokens (Spitzner, 2003), honeyfiles (Yuill et al., 2004), 
digital decoys (Kushner, 2003), decoy files (Bowen et al., 2009), and canary files (Whitham, 2013a). Stoll 
(2005) was the first to publicly discuss the use of fake files in cyber deception. He handcrafted several 
documents to successfully track and identify an unauthorised user on his network. His work inspired several 
others. Bowen, et al (2009) developed the Decoy Document Distributor System, which is a tool for generating 
and monitoring individual fake files. Yuill, et al (2004) also proposed a fake file generation, distribution and 
alert system to simplify the operation and management of individual fake files. Finally, Whitham (2013b) 
proposed a method to automate the generation of fake files to perform a watermarking role, using content from 
the local and nearby directories.   
On a mass scale, Gerwehr and Glenn (2003), and Cohen (2003) independently noted that whole fake file 
systems can be generated for honeypots to suggest that real users have been using the system in normal ways. 
Garfinkel (2009) and Rowe (2006) both proposed generating a synthetic file system using publicly available 
data, Internet searches or other random text. Assuming that there are no copyright concerns, these files can be 
assembled into a hierarchical set of folders resembling a modern file repository. 
RESEARCH APPLICATION  
Realism is critically important for fake files deception (Whitham, 2014). The primary challenge with artificially 
constructed datasets is that while the text content may be genuine, the document arrangements are rarely a true 
representation of a real file system (Arnold and Bell, 1997; Ellard et al., 2003). File system corpora should 
include corruptions, compressed files, duplications, previous versions of documents, natural modifications to 
file characteristics due to operating system processes, and realistic distributions of time meta-data, directories 
and files (Chow et al., 2007). Artificially generated corpora can also fail to mimic the diverse behaviours of 
different users (Ellard et al., 2003) and human document management processes (Goncalves and Jorge, 2003). 
Poor fake file system constructions can also introduce identifiable characteristics that allow a forensic examiner 
or intruder to develop automated processes to counter the deception; a single test function would thus easily 
distinguish the real from the fake (Bowen et al., 2009). Examples include: anomaly-based detection, which can 
be employed against the fake file system, comparing a range of metrics against those of typical computer 
systems (Rowe, 2006), inspecting randomly-chosen files or directories to see if they look ‘normal’ (Fu et al., 
2006), checking content against other nearby material to determine if it is out of place (Lavoie and 
Krishnamoorthy, 2010), or looking at content to identify unusual languages, uncharacteristic formats or text that 
comprise random words, rather than structured sentences (Voris et al., 2012). 
Simulating realistic file repositories can be useful for a range of practical research purposes, such as generating 
test data to improve the performance of compression and retrieval in electronic storage systems. Undertaking 
research on genuine data is complicated by lack of access to real world corpora, primarily due to privacy or 
copyright concerns (Ming et al., 2014; Tarasov et al., 2012). Synthetic data that is more aligned with real world 
environments are likely to yield results that are more transferable to practical outcomes.  
The research is also applicable to the forensic detection of fake files. The presence of fake files could indicate 
malicious or unauthorised activity. Successful detection of fake files may trigger further analysis or allow an 
examiner to discard these files as spurious.  
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METHOD 
Rowe (2006) proposed an approach to detect fake file systems that is relevant to their construction. He believed 
that they could be detected by calculating statistics on a candidate file system and its subdirectories, and 
comparing these results with a typical real system; significant discrepancies suggest deception. This research 
follows Rowe’s approach. The previous 30 years of published file system surveys were reviewed in order to 
identify a set of important characteristics that could be used to either construct fake file systems, or detect their 
presence. Only recognised peer-reviewed publications were included in the literature review.   
PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED FILE SYSTEM METRICS 
There have been more than 15 published surveys of file systems since 1977. Table 1 summarises these major 
file system surveys, in chronological order of publication. Five other notable studies were conducted on files 
and documents, rather than file systems (Barford and Crovella, 1998; Bouayad-Agha and Kilgarriff, 1999; 
Chow, 2007; Cunha, 1995; Rowe, 2010). The relevant findings are grouped by metrics below.   
Distribution by File Size 
Stritter’s (1977) initial observation was that the distribution of file sizes within his sample set could be 
approximated by a Pareto distribution. Soon after, Satyanarayanan (1981) identified that his sample distribution 
decreased nearly monotonically with increasing file size. He was able to use this result to approximate files by 
size based on a hyper-exponential distribution, using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Hájek, 1967), a common approach 
to compare sample distributions against a reference probability. Nearly 20 years later, Barford and Crovella 
(1998) refined Satyanarayanan’s results to create a hybrid model where the bulk of the file sizes were small, 
with a long tail of much less frequently appearing larger files; Satyanarayanan’s approximation split the log-
normal distribution of the body (93% of the data) and a heavy tailed distribution of the larger files (above 133kB 
in size), with a mean file size of 9.357 and standard deviation of 1.318. This result was supported by Douceur 
and Bolosky (1999), who while noting that the previous hyper-exponential distribution was not as natural a fit 
for their data, still preferred a log-normal distribution, with a Pareto tail.  
Shortly after, Downey (2001) compared the performance of log-normal and hybrid Pareto distributions using 
data from Irlam (1993), Arlitt and Jin (2000), Satyanarayanan (1981), and Douceur and Bolosky (1999), also 
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov. He was unable to confirm that the previous distributions were long-tailed (i.e. 
Pareto), but he still identified that the data could be approximated more accurately by either a single or two 
mode log-normal with the distribution skewed towards smaller file sizes. He concluded that even if his model is 
not entirely realistic, it is robust to violations of the assumptions. 
While distribution by file size may appear to be a common measurement of file systems, there are limitations for 
its application in generating synthetic content. Firstly, there is no consensus on a uniform model of distribution; 
some researchers were unable to match previous published file size results (Evans and Kuenning 2002; Vogels, 
1999). There does appear to be consensus on the overall characteristics.  
Secondly, several researchers observed that the average file size increased over time (Agrawal et al., 2007; 
Bennett, 1992; Douceur and Bolosky, 1999; Roselli et al., 2000; Sienknecht et al., 1994), which may account 
for the variance between surveys. The latter may require the development of a generic generation or detection 
metric, which can be adjusted periodically to account for technological change, such as the growth of virtual 
machine snapshots and multimedia. This variation may focus on the tail of the distribution elongating, but with 
the overall split between large and small file sizes remaining consistent.  
Finally, file size metrics are heavily influenced by user activity; different file types exhibit divergent size 
distributions (Evans and Kuenning 2002; Satyanarayanan, 1981). For instance, a file repository supporting a 
graphics company is likely to have a different set of common file types compared with an elderly home user, 
both legitimate real world data. File size models may also be heavily influenced by the inclusion of the 
underlying operating system, rather than just user data. This might require the creation of multiple file size 
models, which can be applied depending on the mix of content that is required, with the operating system 
included as a constant.  
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Table 1 – Summary of Previous File System Surveys 
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Distribution by File Age 
Stritter (1977) was the first to model the age distributions, discovering an exponential distribution. He defined 
file age as the elapsed time since ctime. Douceur and Bolosky (1999) published the next significant distribution.  
They discovered that the median file age on their sample set was 48 days, three times the values collected by 
Stritter (1977), as reported by Smith (1981). Douceur and Bolosky (1999) were able to approximate their results 
using a 2-stage hyper-exponential distribution. 
Douceur and Bolosky (1999) quantified the fit according to the maximum displacement of the cumulative 
curves. Unfortunately, this result failed both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the chi-square test, which limits 
their application as governing distributions, even for their own observations. 
Agrawal, et al. (2007) and Meyer (2012) believed that Douceur and Bolosky’s (1999) previous results were still 
valid. Agrawal, et al. went further to add that: “since the distribution of file age has not appreciably changed 
across the years, we can expect that a prediction algorithm developed today based on the latest distribution will 
apply for several years to come”. This is a promising result for synthetic file system generation.  
There are, however, several limitations of employing previous file age distributions in a general theorem for 
sythentic file system generation. Firstly, the metric relies on ctime. As previously discussed, most modern file 
systems track three time fields for each file: (1) atime (2) mtime and (3) ctime. The latter can be confused with 
‘creation’ time, but the ctime attribute can be modified other than at creation, such as a change in ownership 
(Rowe, 2010). 
Secondly, file time attributes are unreliable due to: (1) variances in the way in which time stamps attributes are 
managed when copying files (Vogels, 1999); and (2) the file system routinely modifying these timestamps as 
part of normal system processes (searching files, anti-virus, etc) (Chow, 2007). 
Thirdly, the distribution of file ages varies significantly across file systems and user job function. For instance, 
the results varied between files systems that provided collective repositories for academic research, as opposed 
to individual engineers working for a commercial entity. Potentially separate algorithms may be required for 
operating system files and those managed by users and organisations.  
Finally, some researchers used trace data, allowing them to observe all file actions, whereas, the snapshot 
process (commonly used) missed: (1) creation, modification and access in-between the periodic snapshots; and 
(2) changes to the file system whilst scanning other parts of the file system. 
Distribution by Functional Lifetime 
Satyanarayanan (1981) was the first to introduce the concept of a file’s functional lifetime (f-lifetime). He 
defined f-lifetime as the difference between the file’s mtime and atime. That is the difference between the last 
access compared to the last modification of the file. He proposed that f-lifetime indicates the time span over 
which the data in the file has been demonstrably useful. He discovered that the distribution of files decreases 
nearly monotonically with increasing f-lifetime. This finding led him to find hyper-exponential distributions that 
approximate these two distributions. Mullender and Tanenbaum (1984), Bennett, et al. (1992), and Douceur 
(1999) also supported his findings.  
Douceur and Bolosky (1999) noted a reduction in median f-lifetimes between their data set (12 days) and the 
original study undertaken by Satyanarayanan (30 days). Both these figures are exclusive of zero f-lifetimes, 
which can be the result of system processes, such as temporary Internet files (Rowe, 2010). They also observed 
that the distribution of f-lifetimes varies widely. On 50% of file systems, the median f-lifetime ranges from zero 
to 6 days, and on 90% of file systems, it ranges from zero to 97 days, reflecting the strong bi-modality. Douceur 
and Bolosky (1999) were able to approximate their distribution with a mixture of a constant distribution for zero 
f-lifetimes and a 3-stage hyper-exponential distribution. This result is similar in distribution to Satyanarayanan 
(1981), but with different parameters, which exposes potential for a general theorem.  
Analysing and collecting data on file times is limited by the same challenges previously discussed in the 
distribution of files by age. In addition, the principle of locality may be important, which essentially states that 
(1) information in recent use is likely to be reused, and (2) information logically adjacent to recently used 
information is likely to be referenced soon (Denning, 1972).  
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Other Time-based Measurements:  
Chow, et al. (2007) provided seven rules associated with attributes times, which are useful for individual file 
classification during forensic analysis. These include: (1) when mtime = ctime, the file has neither been 
modified since its creation, nor copied from another disk location; (2) when mtime < ctime, the file has been 
copied or moved; and (3) when a large number of files with ‘close’ atimes are found inside the hard drive, those 
files are likely to be scanned by some tool, e.g. anti-virus software. 
Rowe and Garfinkel (2010) expanded on Chow’s results. They grouped documents into three categories: (1) 
modified after creation (mtime > ctime), (2) accessed after creation (atime > ctime), and/or (3) accessed after 
modification (atime > mtime). They concurred with previous findings from Agrawal, et al. (2007) that: (1) files 
that were modified or accessed at least one day before creation (mtime < ctime or atime < ctime), suggest that 
the files were downloaded or copied from an external location; (2) clusters of these files in a directory have 
ctimes within a minute, suggest that they were downloaded or copied at the same time; and (3) the transfer of 
data is actually very common in user controlled file systems. Real-world files systems could contain evidence of 
all of the above cases. 
Prior to publishing these results, Rowe (2006) suggested analysing file times to identify the mean within the 
day, week, and year to see periodic patterns. Expanding on this observation, it might also be useful to compare 
the file times against the normal working hours of the owner. For instance a commercial business might have 
the majority of ctimes between 0730 and 1930 Monday to Friday, whereas an individual home user times might 
primarily record activity in the evenings, after work. 
Analysing and collecting data on file times is limited by the same challenges previously discussed in the 
distribution of files by age. Moreover, user activity is likely to heavily influence these results. For instance, 
individual users with a passion for collecting music or movie files may have a higher than average volume of 
externally created files. 
Directory Size Distribution 
Rowe (2006) noted that statistics on directories are less variable than those relating to files, and therefore 
present an important design consideration for fake file system generation. Several researchers (Agrawal et al., 
2007; Bennett et al., 1992; Douceur and Bolosky, 1999; Goncalves and Jorge, 2003; Henderson and Srinivasan, 
2009; Meyer, 2012; Sienknecht et al., 1994) reported statistics on the count of files by directory. Douceur and 
Bolosky (1999) were the first to present a distribution function for directory sizes. Their observations were 
relatively consistent across their sample file systems. Douceur and Bolosky (1999) were able to demonstrate that 
their directory size distribution fit offset inverse-polynomial distributions, which allowed them to develop an 
approximation with a mixture of a constant distribution for zero-size directories and an inverse-square. These 
results were supported by their extended study several years later (Agrawal et al., 2007). 
Two interesting observations suggest that a general distribution function for directory sizes could be sustained. 
Firstly, Agrawal, et al. (2007) noted that the directory size distribution didn’t change over their five-year 
observation period. Secondly, Henderson and Srinivasan (2009) remarked that there was no correlation between 
the number of files or folders a person manages and any of the demographic data collected (age, gender, 
academic or general staff status, department, position and/or employment tenure). 
Four challenges may limit the wider applicability of directory size measurements: (1) there was significant 
variation between published means - results ranged from 2 to 13 files without a consistent value or pattern; (2) 
there was potentially a growth over time of the number of reported directories that did not contain files (but 
could contain directories). Agrawal, et al. (2007) reported that approximately 25% of directories were empty. 
This figure is up from 18% recorded by Douceur and Bolosky (1999), who surveyed a similar data set five years 
earlier. These results are higher than the 14% observed in large industry file servers by Sienknecht et al. (1994). 
(3) Vogels (1999) reported that there was no uniformity in size or content of files between individual user 
document repositories; and (4) Goncalves, et al. (2003) also observed that directories generated or managed 
automatically by applications tend to have large numbers of files, whereas users tend to separate and classify 
documents into sub-directories whenever possible. The latter result might be useful if a fake file system is 
required to mimic applications in addition to user data.  
Sub-directory Distribution 
Sub-directory distribution is the count of sub-directories in each directory (Sienknecht et al., 1994). Henderson 
and Srinivasan (2009) suggested a relationship between directory size and the depth. They observed that the 
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average number of files per folder is greatest at the top levels of the tree (up to a depth of five), and then drops 
off sharply. Agrawal, et al. (2007) noted: “a slight downward trend in this ratio with increasing depth, 
punctuated by three depths whose directories have greater-than-typical counts of files: at depth two are files in 
the Windows and Program Files directories; at depth three are files in the System and System32 directories; and 
at depth seven are files in the web cache directories”. This last result may not hold true for other operating 
systems. 
Henderson and Srinivasan (2009) also discovered that on average 74% of folders in their samples did not 
contain any subfolders. They termed these directories ‘leaf folder’. They also found that there were a high 
average number of subfolders at the root of the tree (~9), which sharply drops off (to < 2) by two or three 
folders depth. Douceur and Bolosky (1999) also observed similar results. They found that 69% of all directories 
contain no subdirectories, 16% contain one, and less than 0.5% contain more than 20. These percentages align 
with those reported by Sienknecht et al. (1994), who found 74%, 11%, and 1%, respectively. Douceur and 
Bolosky (1999) approximated their results using a mixture of constant distribution for zero-size directories and 
an inverse-cube distribution. 
Goncalves and Jorge (2003) remarked that their directory count data resembled a Poisson distribution. The 
results from Agrawal, et al. (2007), the most comprehensive evaluation of directory distribution for individual 
users, also matched a Poisson distribution. This is an notable result for fake file system creation, however, this 
distribution is yet to be tested on organisational document repositories. 
Other Noted Characteristics 
Several researchers provided statistics on file type (including numbers of zip and gzip files), however; only 
Goncalves and Jorge (2003) provided a compression ratio (7%). They defined compression ratio as the number 
of text-based files with a corpus that have been processed by a compression algorithm within the file system 
divided by the total files in the corpus. Their compression ratio excluded images, audio and video content. It is 
possible that real-world file systems may contain a consistent data volume or number of compressed files within 
their contents; however, more work is required to develop predictable algorithm. 
Henderson and Srinivasan (2009) defined duplication ratio as the number of files with an exact replica copy 
within the file system divided by the total files in the corpus. Bouayad-Agha and Kilgarriff (1999) reported that 
15% of their documents had an exact replica copy in their corpus. Henderson and Srinivasan (2009) noted that 
21.8% files had the same name as another file in their file system. While matching file name provides some 
level of confidence that the file could contain identical or similar content, a more precise measure may assess 
resemblance using such tools as fuzzy hashes.  
Finally, there is a conspicuous absence of analysis on file content from the previous surveys. Partial text 
duplication arises for many reasons, such as: popular templates, the compulsory application of warning 
messages or classification banners, and organisational jargon (Bouayad-Agha and Kilgarriff, 1999). Plotting the 
proximity of content reuse may also be important. Its distribution is unlikely to be random. Similar data is likely 
to reside within the same or nearby directories, a characteristic of versioning and common users. It may be 
possible to identify consistent patterns, such as clustering of frequency of word pairs (n-grams), file naming 
conventions and common authorship identification through natural language processing that could assist in 
detection and more realistic generations.  
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Simulating realistic hierarchical file structures is important for research, testing and cyber deception. Currently, 
there is an absence of metrics to guide the generation of synthetic file systems. This paper reviewed the previous 
30 years of file system surveys in order to assess common metrics that could be applied to this problem.  Ten 
potential characteristics were discovered: (1) file size, (2) file age, (3) functional lifetime, (4) directory size, (5) 
file origin analysis using time attributes, (6) file creation times against normal work hours, (7) directory size, (8) 
sub-directory distribution, (9) duplication ratio, and (10) compression ratio. Of these, directory distributions 
appear to provide the greatest potential, especially for individual file systems running Windows. There appear to 
be established trends in age and size distributions, but the specifics are far too dependent on the situation for a 
general theorem, without adjusting thresholds based on ownership (individual or collective), expected working 
hours and roles of the file system, and the employed collection method. The final sets of measures involving 
ratios are too immature without further experimentation. 
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Regardless of maturity, the composition of fake file systems should confirm with all identified real-world 
characteristics. Failure to consider one or more attributes could result in a simple detection process exposing the 
deception.  
Future research should test these identified metrics against a range of individual and collective file systems to 
confirm algorithms and determine acceptable tolerances, particularly with a view to assigning variable 
thresholds for ownership and employment. Other algorithms could analyse file and folder names, and their 
conventions. One notable in these surveys was content analysis. Metrics could be developed to identify 
proximity and clustering of similar data content, authorship and vocabulary as a means of detecting data of 
different origin placed randomly within folders.  
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